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NOTES
Incorporation ·of State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act
Commercial arbitration agreements, unlike most other contracts,
are not entirely creatures of state law. Although state law determines
whether most contracts are binding or enforceable, 1 the Federal Arbitration Act2 (the "Act") governs the enforcement of arbitration
agreements in maritime transactions and in transactions involving
interstate commerce. 3 Congress passed the Act in 1925 to check judicial and legislative hostility to executory arbitration agreements. 4
By creating a federal right to specific enforcement5 of arbitration
agreements, the Act displaced many federal and state court decisions
that refused specific enforcement. 6
I. A contract may be binding and enforceable under state law, but if it violates a federal
statute the courts will not enforce it. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (federal antitrust law preempts state contract law).
2. 9 u.s.c. §§ 1-14 (1976).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section I of the Act defines "commerce" as interstate and foreign
commerce. 9 U.S.C. § I (1976). This Note concerns only arbitration provisions covered by
Sections I and 2 of the Act.
Although the Act applies to arbitration clauses in all interstate and maritime transactions,
it does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, it requires independent subject
matter jursdiction. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). As a result, most arbitration actions in the
federal courts rest on diversity jurisdiction. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395,418 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]o hold the Act inapplicable in diversity cases would be severely to limit its impact"); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc., 271 F.2d at 409.
4. See note 67 i,ifra and accompanying text.
5. Section 4 provides for orders compelling arbitration:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.
9 u.s.c. § 4 (1976).
Section 3 provides for stays of litigation pending arbitration:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
. . . upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration under such an agreement, shall . . . stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had.
9 u.s.c. § 3 (1976).
6. Prior to the passage of the Act, many courts would not specifically enforce arbitration
agreements. See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-22 (1924); Rowe
v. Williams, 97 Mass. 163, 165 (1867). See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924);
S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1924).
The Act is binding not only on federal courts but also on state courts under the supremacy
clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Where there is no independent federal subject matter jurisdiction and the arbitration clause satisfies 9 U.S.C. §§ I & 2, the parties will be relegated to the
state courts, but their rights will be determined under the Act. Several state courts have ac-
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But the principles governing the Act's displacement of state law
have remained unclear ever since 1925. Although the Act makes arbitration agreements enforceable and irrevocable in most circumstances, its second section permits revocation upon "such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 7 The
Act fails to specify whether these grounds for revocation are to be
found in existing state law or in a new body of federal common law. 8
If the Act requires courts to find these grounds in existing state law,
the federal law of arbitration should be a patchwork, varying with
each state's contract law. If, however, the Act requires courts to create independent federal grounds for revocation, the law of arbitration should be nationally uniform. Congress failed to provide
.choice-of-law rules under the Act;9 the courts, lacking clear congressional guidance, have gone down different paths. Some courts have
concluded that the Act replaces all state law governing arbitration
agreements with federal common law; 10 others have applied state
laws to some arbitration issues;" yet others have failed to specify
what law they were applying. 12
This Note proposes a solution to this choice-of-law problem.
Section I surveys the·courts' response to Congress's silence and finds
confusion and disarray. Section II argues that courts should apply
the state law pertinent to arbitration unless that law places heavier
burdens on arbitration contracts than on other contracts; where state
law does discriminatorily burden arbitration, the courts should apply
the pertinent state rules applicable to "any contract." 13 It concludes
knowledged their duty to apply the Act. E.g., A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Roderi v. Dow
Chem. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 576, 255 N.E.2d 774, 307 N.Y.S.2d 660, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939
(1970); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Line Indus., Inc., 231 Ga. 329, 201 S.E.2d 452
(1973); Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 9 Wash. App. 337,512 P.2d 751 (1973); REA Express
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 447 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
7. 9
§ 2 (1976).
8. This way of formulating the question may offend those who contend that a court's construction of a federal statute and its formulation of federal common law pursuant to statutory
authorization are at bottom the same thing. See Westen & Lehman, Is There L!/efor Erie
After the .Death of.Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 331-36 (1980). Hence, even ifit construes
the Act to require the application of state law, a court makes federal common law. This is true,
but irrelevant to the subject of this Note. This Note asks whether the Act should be interpreted: (a) to allow courts the freedom to define as an independent federal matter the proper
grounds for the revocation of arbitration agreements; or (b) to restrict that freedom and re•
quire courts to refer to state contract law for these grounds.
9. See text at note 18 iefra.
IO. See, e.g., cases cited in note 20 iefra.
l l. See, e.g., cases cited in note 30 i'!fra.
12. See, e.g., Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1238 (D.
Neb. 1976) (not stating whether state or federal law controls); Tepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic
Tile Co., 259 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.3d 1145 § 3(b)
(1979), for a survey of the various approaches taken by the courts.
13. A court must, of course, decide which state's contract law to apply to arbitration agreements. This question can be answered with a routine choice of law analysis: a court should
apply the same state law that it would apply in an ordinary contract case.

u.s.c.
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that the "grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract," although
determined as a matter of federal policy, are to be found in state law
rather than in an independent federal law.. Section III applies this
general principle of choice to a series of illustrative state rules.
!.

THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE

The typical choice-of-law question under the Act arises when a
court must decide whether the parties to a lawsuit must arbitrate
their contractual disputes. 14 Before ordering arbitration or staying
judicial proceedings pending arbitration, the court must find that the
parties have made an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. 15 Whether
the agreement is enforceable may depend on whether state contract
law or federal common law applies. 16 But neither the text 17 of the
Act nor its legislative history clearly define the extent of the Act's
ouster or modification of state contract law. 18 In view of this ambi14. See note 5 supra.
15. The wording of the Act implies that different standards govern the issuance of orders to
arbitrate and orders staying litigation. Section 3, the stay provision, requires a preliminary
finding that the issue "is referable to arbitration," while Section 4, governing affirmative orders
to arbitrate, requires such an order if the court is satisfied that the "making" and performance
of the arbitration agreement are not "in issue." See note 5 supra. However, the Supreme
Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967), held it
"inconceivable that Congress intended the rule to differ depending upon which party to the
arbitration agreement first invokes the assistance of a federal court," and therefore held that
"in passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may
consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate."
16. See text at notes 94-106, 117-30 infra.
17. Section 2 does not state whether courts are to refer to state or federal rules oflaw and
equity in deciding whether there are "grounds . . . for the revocation" of the contract. 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 4 instructs courts to determine whether the "making of the agreement for arbitration" is "in issue," 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976); the law governing this determination
logically should be the same as that which furnishes the grounds for revocation in Section 2,
but Section 4 does not help decide what law that should be. See Note, Federal Arbitration Act
and Application of the "Separability Doctrine" in Federal Courts, 1968 DUKE L.J. 588, 603-04
n.68.
18. Under the commerce and admiralty powers, U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3· and art. III,
§ 2, and under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, Congress could have enacted
legislation governing all issues surrounding the formation and enforcement of arbitration
clauses in contracts involving maritime transactions or interstate or foreign commerce. But the
legislative history reveals no intent to do so. See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal
Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 386 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring) ("(T]he legislative
history of the Arbitration Act of 1925 reveals little awareness on the part of Congress that state
law might be affected"). Apparently, Congress was preoccupied with the right to specific enforcement of arbitration agreements, and so never considered that the Act might affect other
legal issues relating to arbitration clauses. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 419 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (19/44); Committee on Commerce, Trade &
Commercial Law, The United Stales Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A.J. 153, 15455 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Commillee on Commerce]. However, in Prima Paint the
Supreme Court implied that the Act applies to other arbitration issues in addition to specific
enforcement. See text at notes 40-49 infra. For a more detailed explanation of the history of
the Act, in Congress and in the courts, see generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 409-23 (Black, J., dissenting); Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbi-
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guity, it is perhaps unsurprising that courts have differed in the extent to which they incorporate state laws as federal rules of
decision. 19
One group of cases interprets the Act as commanding courts to
create a federal common law of commercial arbitration without any
reference to state law. 20 In the leading case of Robert Lawrence Co.
v. .Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. ,21 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit created a federal rule to interpret the scope of an arbitration
clause more broadly than the state rule would have permitted. 22 The
plaintiff had contracted to purchase fabric from the defendant; the
parties had agreed to arbitrate "[a]ny complaint, controversy or
question which [might] arise with respect to [the] contract." 23 The
/ration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926); Commillee on Commerce, supra; Note, The Conse•
quences ofa Broad Arbitration Clause Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 52 B.U. L. REV. 571
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Consequences]; Note, supra note 17; Note, Scope of the United
States Arbitration Act in Commercial Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, 58 Nw. U. L. REV,
468 (1963); Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 VAND. L. REV, 607 (1967);
Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 ofthe United Stales Arbitration Act: A Farrago ofRights,
Remedies and a Right toa Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847 (1960); Comment, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 565
(1968).
19. Some courts have avoided the choice-of-law issue by noting that the relevant rule of
decision would be the same under either federal or state law. E.g., Farkar Co. v. R.A. Hanson
Disc., Ltd., 583 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1978) ("We find it unnecessary to comment except briefly
on . . . 'federal contract common law,' 'federal common law,' 'federal substantive law' and
'national [federal] substantive law.' . . . [U]nder any applicable law the result would be the
same") (emphasis in original), mod!/ied, 604 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Hellenic Lines,
Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 F.2d 753, 756 (2d Cir. 1967) ("(W]hether state or federal law
[of duress] be deemed controlling makes no practical difference in this case; we have found no
distinction between them . . . .") (footnote omitted).
20. See, eg., Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk Gmbh, 585 F.2d 39
(3d Cir. 1978); Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1971); Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,404 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960);
In re Ferrara S.P.A., 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), tefd., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978);
Avila Group, Inc. v. Norma J., 426 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bigge Crane & Rigging Co.
v. Docutel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). One district court has
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as federal common law controlling "questions of contract formation arising in cases under the Federal Arbitration Act." Lee Tai Textile Co. v.
Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1404, 1406 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Professor Furnish argues
that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act in Prima Paint requires the courts to treat
arbitration agreements as wholly separate contracts from the contracts in which they are contained. Therefore, "the court must proceed to consider the validity and scope of the arbitration
agreement according to the standards of the United States Arbitration Act and no other."
Since arbitration agreements when divorced from the larger contract are not transactions in
goods, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is not directly applicable, although its use by
federal courts "as a source of law by analogy is desirable.'' Furnish, Commercial Arbitration
Agreements and the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 317, 323, 325-26 (1979).
This Note argues that the Act incorporates non-discriminatory state law. Because the U.C.C.
generally applies equally to arbitration clauses and other provisions in sales contracts, the
courts should ordinarily adopt it as controlling law under the Act. However, the courts should
not adopt discriminatory state court interpretations of the U.C.C. See notes 109-19 i'!fra and
accompanying text.
21. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
22. See 271 F.2d at 412.
23. 271 F.2d at 404.
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plaintiff claimed that the purchase agreement had been procured by
defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations, and sued in federal court
for damages. 24 The defendant claimed that the agreement to arbitrate was valid, and that the court should stay court proceedings
pending an arbitrator's resolution of the issue of fraud. 25 New
York's contract law would have taken the issue of fraud out of the
hands of the arbitrator, and would instead have required the court to
decide the matter. 26 The Robert Lawrence court held, however, that
the Act creates a body of substantive federal law that encompasses
all the legal issues surrounding arbitration clauses: it does not require any reference to state rules of decision. 27 The Act's "liberal
policy of promoting arbitration" 28 made the arbitration clause a separable and enforceable contract apart from the purchase contract.29
Although the arbitration provision was contained in and part of the
purchase contract, the issue of fraud in the purchase agreement was
nonetheless arbitrable.
A second group of cases shows a greater readiness to look to state
law. 30 These courts differ, however, in their reasons for applying
state rather than federal law. In Wjdel Associates v. Thermaso!,
Ltd ,31 for example, a federal district court said that it would generally apply state contract law, except for "those state statutes [and
decisions] which limit arbitration agreements with rules not applicable to other contracts." 32 In Wjdel, the plaintiffs claimed that a
Texas partnership statute invalidated an arbitration agreement executed by their partner because the statute required all the partners of
a partnership to authorize arbitration agreements.33 The statute only
required such unanimity in the case of arbitration agreements and a
24. 271 F.2d at 404.
25. 271 F.2d at 404.
26. See 271 F.2d at 412.
27. 271 F.2d at 409.
28. 271 F.2d at 410. For this Note's different reading of the Act's policies, see notes 71-83
i,!fra and accompanying text.
29. 271 F.2d at 409-10.
30. See, e.g., Southeastern Enameling Corp. v. General Bronze Corp., 434 F.2d 330 (5th
Cir. 1970); American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811,
815-17 (6th Cir. 1959); Wydel Assocs. v. Thermasol, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Tex. 1978)
(Spears, C.J., mem. op.); Duplan Corp. v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Litton RCS, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commn., 376 F. Supp. 579, 590
(E.D. Pa. 1974), qffd., Sll F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975).
31. 452 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (Spears, C.J., mem. op.).
32. 452 F. Supp. at 742.
33. The statute in question is the Uniform Partnership Act§ 9(3)(e), codified in Texas as
TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 9(3)(e) (Vernon):
unless authorized by the other partners ... , one or more but less [sic] than all the partners have no authority to:
(e)

Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference.
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few other types of contracts; a single partner could bind the partnership to other contracts.34 The court held that the Act overrode the
statute's unanimity provisions because the provisions placed greater
limits on the authority of partners to enter arbitration agreements
than on their authority to enter other kinds of contracts. 35 The court
rejected the discriminatory unanimity requirement, and turned instead to the state law governing other contracts as the appropriate
rule under the Act. 36
Another federal district court saw a different place for state law
in .Duplan Corp. (.Duplan Yarn .Division) v. W.B. .Davis Hosiery Mills,
Inc. 37 In .Duplan, the court said that federal law governs issues of
arbitrability or interpretation, while state law controls issues of formation or validity:
It is the "scope" rather than the existence of an agreement to arbitrate
which is determined by reference to federal law. The question whether
a valid arbitration clause exists involves general contract principles;
state law governs the disposition of that question. 38

Despite basic differences between Wydel and .Duplan, both cases
contrast sharply with the view of courts following Robert Lawrence
that it is "unnecessary to decide where the contract was made, what
state law governs, or what that state law is."39
The Supreme Court has done little to resolve the conflict between
courts that hold that the Act creates a completely independent federal arbitration law and those that choose to incorporate state contract law. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co., 40 the Court faced a set of facts almost identical to the facts in
Robert Lawrence, and reached the same result: it held that an arbitrator and not a court should determine whether a purchase agreement containing an arbitration agreement had been induced by
fraud. 41 The Court, however, declined to follow the theory of the
Robert Lawrence court;42 it relied instead on a questionable interpre34. Under the Texas statute, one partner may bind others to contracts executed in the usual
course of partnership business. TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 9(1) (Vernon).
35. 452 F. Supp. at 742.
36. 452 F. Supp. at 742.
37. 442 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
38. 442 F. Supp. at 88 (citations omitted). The .Dupion court applied North Carolina's
reading ofU.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b), which held that an arbitration clause on a confirmation form
was a "material alteration," and hence did not become part of the contract. 442 F. Supp. at 89.
The "federal substantive law" rule used by the petitioner would have defined "materiality" so
as to create a binding contract to arbitrate. 442 F. Supp. at 88. See text at note 109 infra.
39. Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1971).
40. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
41. Compare 388 U.S. at 396-404 with 271 F.2d at 404-06, 409-12.
42. The majority said that it agreed with the Robert Lawrence court, "albeit for somewhat
different reasons . . . ." 388 U.S. at 400. Justice Harlan, in a brief concurrence, stated that he
would also "affirm the judgment below on the basis of Robert Lawrence Co. v. .Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc. ..." 388 U.S. at 407.
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tation of section 4 of the Act, which states that a court shall order
arbitration if "the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue."43 The Court read this
language to say that the making of an arbitration agreement is put
into issue by allegation of defects in the arbitration agreement itself,
but not by allegation of defects in the underlying purchase agreement. 44 Thus, the Court agreed with the Robert Lawrence court that
an arbitration agreement is separable from the contract within which
it is contained.45 But since the majority purported to find this rule of
separability in the text of the Act itself, Prima Paint avoided the
troubling issue of whether to incorporate state law or create independent federal law where the Act provides no explicit textual answer.
Justice Black, in a vigorous dissent joined by Justices Douglas
and Stewart, argued that the majority had not really avoided the
choice-of-law issue: they had resolved it in the same manner as Robert Lawrence.46 Section 4's command to order arbitration if "the
making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue," he
noted, "far from providing an 'explicit answer,' merely poses the further question of what kind of allegations put the making of the arbitration agreement in issue."47 The Act nowhere provides an answer
to this "further question." Under New York law, an allegation of
fraud in the inducement of the entire contract would have put the
making of the arbitration agreement in issue, and no stay could have
been ordered.48 Because the majority stayed litigation pending arbitration, Justice Black thought that they had necessarily applied an
independent federal common-law rule, and not, as they claimed, a
rule explicit in the text of the Act.49
Justice Black's broad reading of Prima Paint seems overly pessimistic. While his disbelief that the majority found an express rule of
separability in the text of the Act is understandable, the majority
purported to do no more than discover that express rule. 50 Prima
43. 9 u.s.c. § 4 (1976).
44. See 388 U.S. at 403-04.
45. See 388 U.S. at 403-04, 410; Furnish, supra note 20, at 321-22.
46. See 388 U.S. at 408-11 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. 388 U.S. at 410 (Black, J., dissenting).
48. The Court, at least, assumed that New York law would have such an effect. See 388
U.S. at 411 n.4 {Black, J., dissenting).
49. 388 U.S. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting). The majority, however, clearly did not think
that they were creating federal common law. See 388 U.S. at 403.
50. Prima Paints rule of separability is really two rules. First, an arbitration agreement is
an agreement separate from the purchase agreement that it accompanies. Second, allegations
of fraud in the commercial contract can never place the making of the arbitration agreement in
issue. The second rule follows from the first because of section 2 of the Act. Since the rule of
separability requires that we consider the underlying commercial agreement and the accompanying arbitration agreement to be separate contracts, section 2 forbids a state to allow allega-
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Paint does not require federal courts to apply federal law to decide
whether defects in the separable arbitration agreement place its making at issue under section 4, nor does it tell courts what law to tum to
in deciding what grounds exist for the revocation of any contract
under section 2. These further questions. have continued to divide
courts in the thirteen years since Prima Paint was decided. Some
continue to embrace Robert Lawrence;51 others have turned to state
law to determine grounds for revocation under section 2. 52 Prima
Paint has apparently only compounded the confusion surrounding
the Act's choice-of-law question. A satisfying answer can only come
from an analysis of the purposes that Congress sought to further in
the Act,53 and from a choice among those purposes where they are
inconsistent.

II.

CHOICE-OF-LAW PRINCIPLES UNDER THE ACT

In 1924, Congress apparently believed that the Arbitration Act
merely settled "a question of procedure" in making arbitration
agreements enforceable in federal courts, and that it did not create
"substantive law."54 The courts, however, have since recognized that
the Act does create a valid body of substantive federal law that controls decisions both in federal courts and in state courts. 55 But even
though the right to enforce an arbitration agreement is a federal
right, the content of that right should be determined by reference to
state law.
Courts often determine the content of federal statutory rights by
reference to state law. 56 As the Supreme Court said in another context, "the scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but
tions of fraud in the underlying commercial agreement to taint the making of an arbitration
agreement (breath) unless the state allows allegations of fraud in any contract to place at issue
the making of any other contemporaneous contract between the same two parties. The text at
notes 64-70 i,!fra explains why only nondiscriminatory state laws should be incorporated
under the Act.
51. See, e.g., Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk Gmbh, 585 F.2d 39
(3d Cir. 1978); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 949 (1972).
52. See, e.g., Southeastern Enameling Corp. v. General Bronze Corp., 434 F.2d 330 (5th
Cir. 1970); Wydel Assocs. v. Thermasol, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (Spears, C.J.,
mem. op.); Duplan Corp. v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Litton RCS, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commn., 376 F. Supp. 579, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
qffd, 5ll F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975).
53. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1979). See generally
Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of .Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1084 (1964).
54. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1924).
55. See Prim~ Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1967);
Robert Lawrence· Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404-06 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). State courts also have the duty to apply the Act. See note 6
supra.
56. See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979); United States v. Kimbell
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that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by state,
rather than federal law." 57 Deciding whether a given federal statute
should be interpreted to incorporate state law requires a two-stage
analysis. 58 First, a court should inquire whether the federal statute
forbids the incorporation of state laws either explicitly or implicitly.59 If Congress has declared that federal rules independent of
state laws will apply, or if adoption of state laws would conflict with
the language of the statute, then the inquiry ceases: adoption of state
law is forbidden. 60 Second, even if adoption of state law does not
directly conflict with the statute, a court should inquire whether the
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 413 U.S.
580 (1973); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
Federal courts commonly adopt state law as the appropriate measure of federal law. E.g.,
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (state law adopted as the appropriate
federal rule for establishing the relative priority of competing federal and private liens); Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979) (state law borrowed in action under 25 U.S.C.
§ 194 to determine whether changes in river were avulsive or accretive); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (state law adopted to decide ifan illegitimate offspring was a "child"
within the meaning of the Copyright Act); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United States,
352 U.S. 128, 132 (1956) (although state law generally determines liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976), Massachusetts wrongful death statute held "at war
with" the standard of a liability provided by Congress, and hence not applied under the Act);
United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (local law incorporated in action brought under the Miller Act: "[t]here is no supervening federal interest here
which dictates the fashioning of uniform federal law to displace the law of the State where all
parties concerned reside and all material facts occurred"). See generally Note, 17ze Role of
State Law in Federal Tax .Determinations, 72 HARV. L. Rev. 1350 (1959); Note, Adopting State
Law as the Federal Rule of.Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1976) [hereinafter cited as "Chicago Note"].
57. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). See generally Chicago Note, supra
note 56, at 823:
In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court removed the power of the federal courts to
declare independent federal common law in deciding issues which would be governed by
state law in state courts. Later cases have held, however, that where the matter before the
court is closely related to a federal function, state law does not govern of its own force and
the federal courts have the responsibility to fashion a federal rule to decide the issue. In
C/ea,jield Trust Co. v. United States [318 U.S. 363 (1943)], the Court indicated that, unless
Congress has specified otherwise, a federal court in this situation has the option either to
"adopt" state law as the content of the federal rule or to develop uniform federal law to
resolve the question (footnotes omitted).
58. The model for this analysis derives from Chicago Note, supra note 56. The second
stage of that note's analysis is modified here so as to weigh federal interests in uniformity
against federal interests in applying state law, instead of weighing federal interests against state
interests. See Chicago Note, supra note 56, at 829-30, 842-44. This modification better accounts for the supremacy of valid federal law over state law. See Westen & Lehman, supra
note 8, at 357. But see Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382,386
(2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring) ("Having no clear mandate from Congress as to the
extent to which state statutes and decisions are to be superseded, we must be cautious in construing the [arbitration] act lest we excessively encroach on the powers which Congressional
policy, if not the Constitution, would reserve to the states"); Mishkin, Some Further Last
Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. Rev. 1682, 1683 (1974) ("[t]hat Congress may have
constitutional power to make federal law displacing state substantive policy dcies not imply an
equal range of power for federal judges"). See generally Westen & Lehman, supra note 8.
59. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-29 (1979); Chicago Note,
supra note 56, at 824-27, 835-38.
60. See Chicago Note, supra note 56, at 835; cases cited in id at n.73.
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federal interests in applying state law outweigh the federal interests
in applying independent federal rules. 61
A. Adoption of Nondiscriminatory State Law
The Federal Arbitration Act contains no clear mandate that independent federal rules should oust all state laws governing the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 62 But some state laws clearly
conflict with the Act, and must be ousted. For example, section 4 of
the Act, as interpreted in Prima Paint, expressly rejects state rules
that place the making of an arbitration agreement at issue because of
a defect in the making of the separable underlying contract. After
Prima Paint, a federal court, despite conflicting state law, must order
arbitration under section 4 of the Act or stay judicial proceedings
under section 3 if it determines that the "making" or "performance"
of the arbitration agreement are not "in issue." 63
Even after a state law passes the Prima Paint test of separability,
it may still conflict with section 2 of the Act. Section 2 makes arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 64 Since all allegations that place the "making" or "performance" of the agreement at issue under section 4 are also grounds
for revocation, 65 a court must ascertain that a state law does not con61. See note 58 supra; cases cited in note 56 supra.
62. See notes 17 & 18 supra and accompanying text.
63. 388 U.S. at 403-04. See note 15 supra.
64. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1976).
65. All claims that put the making or performance of an arbitration agreement in issue section 4 claims - must rest upon section 2 grounds for revocation, if "revocation" is understood to mean the prevention of arbitration despite one party's opposition. Because all section
4 claims must rest upon section 2 grounds, an allegation must satisfy the requirements of both
section 2 and section 4 before it can prevent arbitration by putting the making of the arbitration agreement in issue.
Although all section 4 claims must rest upon section 2 grounds for revocation, not all
grounds for revocation necessarily give rise to claims that put the making or performance at
issue under section 4. Some courts have held, for instance, that claims of waiver or !aches do
not put the making at issue, and that such claims must therefore be heard by the arbitrator;
waiver or !aches, however, might still be grounds for revocation under section 2. See, e.g.,
Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Phillip & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222 (2d Cir. 1980) (interpreting
section 4 to require arbitrator to decide timeliness of demand for arbitration); World Brilliance
Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1965) (!aches and waiver held questions
for arbitrator). This Note is concerned only with the choice of state versus federal grounds of
revocation, and not with the question of which tribunal should apply these grounds (the court
versus the arbitrator); hence this Note need not decide which valid section 2 grounds do not
place the making or performance in issue under section 4. The extent to which courts should
remit the consideration of grounds for revocation to an arbitrator's decision should probably
be viewed as a matter of federal statutory interpretation independent of state law. See B.
Calkins, The "Making" of an Agreement to Arbitrate: A Question for the Court or the Arbitrator? (Nov. 4, 1980) (unpublished paper on file with the Michigan Law Review). Courts
might take either of two approaches to this job of interpretation. First, if a court found the
making not in issue despite allegations based upon valid section 2 grounds, it would order
arbitration. Then the arbitrator would presumably apply the legal rules that section 2 makes
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flict with section 2 of the Act before applying the law pursuant to
section 4. 66
State laws conflict with section 2 of the Act if they discriminate
against arbitration agreements, if, that is, they provide "grounds . . .
for the revocation" of arbitration agreements that are not applicable
·to "any contract." Congress's primary purpose in section 2 was to
undo judicial and legislative hostility to executory arbitration agreements; before passage of the Act, many states had held such agreements revocable and unenforceable. 67 An example of a hostile state
law that conflicts with section 2 is the Texas statute at issue in Collins
Radio v. Ex-Cell-0-Corp. 68 The statute required acknowledgment
by a state-licensed lawyer that the client had been advised of the
consequences of agreeing to arbitrate.69 Since state law placed no
such limitation on other types of contracts, the court properly refused to adopt the acknowledgment requirement as the federal rule
of decision. 70 To put the matter in terms of the two-stage analysis set
forth above, discriminatory state rules fail to qualify for adoption at
the first stage: they conflict with language of section 2 of the Act.
The second stage of the adoption analysis concerns only state
rules that do not conflict with the Act. If a state law allows the same
"grounds . . . for the revocation" of arbitration agreements that it
allows for the revocation of "any contract," it does not conflict with
either sections 2 or 4 of the Act. The question remains, however,
applicable. Second, a court might interpret the term "making" so that any valid section 2
ground for revocation would place the making in issue, and thus no ground for revocation
would be a matter for the arbitrator. The first of these alternatives seems likely to prevail,
given cases like Conticommodity Services and World .Bril!ance.
66. Courts should be little troubled by application of Section 2 to claims under Section 4 of
the Act. In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court deftly extended the Section 4 requirement that a
claim put the "making at issue" to an appeal for stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration under Section 3. See 388 U.S. at 404. Just as "it is inconceivable that Congress intended
the rule to differ depending upon which party to the arbitration agreement first invokes the
assistance of a federal court," 388 U.S. at 404, it is inconceivable that Congress intended the
non-discriminatory command of Section 2 to go unheeded simply because it was not repeated
in the enforcement provisions of Section 3 and Section 4.
There may be reasons to read the Act less than literally and allow courts a limited freedom
to find the making placed in issue by a state's discriminatory but reasonable grounds for the
revocation of arbitration agreements. Congress sought to undo legislative and judicial hostility
to arbitration, not to preclude completely any reasonable regulation of it. Section 2's formula
was an attempt to express congressional disapproval of discriminatory hostility succinctly, but
that formula, if read literally, is too broad for its purposes. Under some circumstances, therefore, the policies of the Act may tolerate a court's decision that unique but not hostile grounds
for revocation may put the making in issue.
67. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-3 (1924); note 6 supra.
68. 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1972).
69. 467 F.2d at 997.
70. 467 F.2d at 997-98. The court's reasoning, however, suggested a principle that this
Note's analysis would find overbroad: "the Federal Act bars resort to state arbitration rules to
determine the validity of arbitration clauses . . . ." 467 F.2d at 997.
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whether the federal interests in adopting an independent body of
federal arbitration law outweigh the federal interests in applying
nondiscriminatory state law.
Federal courts might desire to apply independent federal law to
arbitration agreements because of a belief that the resultant uniformity among jurisdictions will ease administration of the Act71 and promote its purposes. A similar beliefled the Supreme Court to create a
nationally uniform body of labor arbitration law.72 This uniformity
furthers and is made necessary by the strong federal policy of promoting the arbitration of labor disputes. 73 Because labor arbitration
is greatly preferable to its likely alternative - industrial strife - the
courts have created a specialized and uniform body of law that differs in many particulars from ordinary principles of contract law. 74
By comparison, the federal interest in applying a uniform federal
law to commercial arbitration agreements is relatively weak. The
legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress was content to
place arbitration on an equal footing with other contracts;75 uniformity is not necessary to achieve such equality. In fact, as is discussed below,76 the two goals are inconsistent. The Act can as easily
prevent the frustration of contracting parties' intent if courts apply
nondiscriminatory state law as it can if they apply uniform nationwide rules. 77
71. Cf. Chicago Note, supra note 56, at 839 ("Uniformity is often sought to ease the burden
of federal administration").
72. "The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under
state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation
and administration of collective agreements . . . The importance of the area which would be
affected by separate systems of substantive law makes the need for a single body of federal law
particularly compelling." Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
13. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
74. Federal policy prefers arbitration oflabor grievances because it promotes "stabilization
through the collective bargaining agreement. . . . A major factor in achieving industrial
peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining
agreement." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960) (footnotes and citation omitted). In other words, arbitration oflabor disputes is the
"substitute for industrial strife." 363 U.S. at 578. Litigation is not a realistic alternative, and
hence the federal interest is in channeling labor disputes into arbitration. In contrast, "[i]n the
commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation." 363 U.S. at 578. There is less
harm to the economy when commercial parties choose to litigate rather than arbitrate their
disputes than when unions strike over contract disputes. Thus, there is not the same compelling public interest in encouraging commercial parties to resolve their disputes through arbitration. See Consequences, supra note 18, at 592. But cf. Furnish, supra note 20, at 334 ("[T]he
objectives of contractual exchange in our society . . . frequently are served best today by arbitration rather than litigation").
15. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1924).
16. See notes 84-89 iefra and accompanying text.
77. This assumes that as long as the applicable law makes it possible for parties to achieve
their contractual intent, the parties will know equally well in either case what the applicable
law is, and tailor their agreement accordingly.
If the parties do not take the time to discover the applicable law, it may be more likely that
they will assume that nondiscriminatory state contract law applies to their arbitration clause.
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Some courts, to be sure, have discerned "a strong federal policy
in favor of [commercial] arbitration" over litigation.78 This policy,
they say, arises "to help ease the current congestion of court calendars."79 But the authorities relied upon by these courts reveal no
such policy. 80 Although Congress recognized that some parties
choose arbitration to eliminate the "delay and cost of litigation," 81 it
does not follow that an independent public policy favors the arbitration rather than litigation of commercial disputes. 82 The Act favors
arbitration only to the extent that it puts arbitration agreements on
Typically only a fraction of the total time spent negotiating the document will go into the
arbitration provision. Often, it will be included at the last minute without serious consideration. These circumstances would tend to aggravate the uncertainty caused by applying independent federal rules to the arbitration clause, because the parties are likely to assume that
the same rules govern formation and interpretation of the arbitration clause as the bulk of the
contract.
The requirement of independent subject matter jurisdiction under the Act also increases
the likelihood that the parties will rely on state law. The Act governs all contracts involving
interstate commerce. 9 U.S.C. §§ I & 2. Thus, whenever there is no diversity (or other federal) jurisdiction, arbitration cases covered by the Act will be brought in state courts, where
they will be governed by federal law. To what body of contract law are state court judges to
look? There is no comprehensive body of federal contract common law. How are they to
guess what independent rule a federal court would apply in questions that have not yet been
decided by the federal courts (and where it is not clear that the Act's policies require a particular rule)? See Friendly, In Praise ofErie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 383, 406 (1964).
78. Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d IOI, 106 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976). Accord, Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271
F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); Griffin v. Semperit of
America, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (S.D. Tex. 1976). See Furnish, supra note 20, at 333
("Many courts state a direct prejudice in favor of commercial arbitration").
Congress could have declared a policy of favoring commercial arbitration; and such favoritism might have called forth a uniform federal common law of commercial arbitration. But
Congress has not done so.
79. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
80. The court in Robert Lawrence was apparently the'first to announce such a policy. Consequences, supra note 18, at 592. The court cited two commercial arbitration cases, neither of
which supports the proposition that a federal policy favors arbitration over litigation to ease
the congestion of the courts. The citation to Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester
Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 449, 453 (1935), was apparently to the Court's reference to "congressional approval of arbitration." It is difficult to see how the Robert Lawrence court stretched
this to support the proposition that Congress favors arbitration independently of the intent of
the parties. The citation to Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/Av. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d
978 (2d Cir. 1942), was apparently to that court's quotation from the report of the House
Committee that referred to the "agitation against the costliness and delays oflitigation." H.R.
REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)~ cited in 126 F.2d at 985. However, this "agitation"
came from businessmen whose expectations about arbitration agreements were being undermined by the courts. Congress never mentioned any need to reduce the case loads of the
federal courts. Courts following Robert Lawrence have cited Robert Lawrence itself as the
source of this policy. See, e.g., Southwest Indus. Import & Export, Inc. v. Wilmod Co., 524
F.2d 468,470 (5th Cir. 1975). For an argument that there is a pro-arbitration policy, see Note,
supra note 17, at 603-04 n.68.
81. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
82. One author suggests that these courts may have erroneously borrowed the policy favoring arbitration from the field of labor arbitration. See Consequences, supra note 18, at 592.
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equal footing with other contracts in the face of state hostility to arbitration. Nothing in the Act suggests that arbitration agreements
should be more irrevocable or enforceable than other contracts. 83
Thus, no federal policy favors an independent, pro-arbitration federal common law.
Even if favoritism to arbitration provides no justification for independent federal rules, courts might apply federal rules if they believed that Congress assumed that uniform federal law would apply
to all federal arbitration cases. Since Congress passed the Act in the
days before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 84 it may have assumed that federal courts would look to a uniform federal contract law in deciding
what were valid grounds for the revocation of arbitration agreements. 85 And since Congress passed the Act pursuant to the commerce clause, 86 this assumption would still be effective today despite
Erie. According to this reasoning, courts should still read the Act
today as commanding the creation of uniform federal rules.
Such a reading of the Act, however, would elevate an incorrect
congressional assumption above the more important congressional
goal of making the law governing arbitration agreements congruent
with the law governing commercial contracts. Through the Act,
Congress sought to place arbitration agreements "upon the same
footing as other contracts" 87 and to help contracting parties achieve
their intent to make valid arbitration agreements. 88 At the time of
· the Act's passage, Congress could have assumed that, because federal common law would govern not only arbitration agreements but
also their underlying commercial contracts, there would be both na83. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. I, (1924) ("Arbitration agreements are
purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live
up to his agreement"), as cited in Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Co., 126
F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942).
84. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts do not have the power to declare independent federal common law in deciding issues that would be governed by state law in state
courts).
85. [Before Erie] [t]he federal courts had interpreted Swift [Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (6
Pet.) I (1842)] (or more likely, misinterpreted it to mean) (Footnote reference] that they
could adopt a federal common law in diversity cases that differed from the state common
law of the forum, and that they could fashion such a federal law in all areas of regulation,
without a reference to subject matter.
[Footnote]. It is not obvious that Justice Story intended in Swift to create a federal
common law rule that differed from state common law rules. Rather, he probably
would have said that he was identifying the common law rule . . . .
Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 338 & n.88.
86. Congress rested the Act not only upon Congressional power to regulate procedure in
the federal courts, but also "upon the Federal control over interstate commerce and over admiralty." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1924).
87. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. l (1924).
, 88. See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir.
1959) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring) (Congress sought "to assure those who desired arbitration
and whose contracts related to interstate commerce that their expectations would not be undermined by federal judges, . . . by state courts or legislatures").
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tionwide uniformity of arbitration law and congruence between the
law governing commercial agreements and arbitration clauses. After
Erie, however, state law governs ordinary commercial agreements.
Consequently, uniformity and congruence have become inconsistent
goals. Since Congress never expressly commanded uniformity
among jurisdictions, but only (perhaps) assumed it as a consequence
of a now-obsolete notion of the scope of federal common law, courts
should today give effect to Congress's desire to achieve congruence:
they should incorporate the same law that governs commercial contracts - nondiscriminatory state law. 89
While the federal interests in applying independent federal law
are weak and inconsistent with the goal of congruence, the federal
interests in applying nondiscriminatory state law are strong. The
first such interest is the convenience of drawing upon a "ready-made
body of state law" 90 as "an appropriate and convenient measure of
the content of the federal law." 91 No unified body of federal law
governing arbitration exists. 92 Nor would such a body of law result
soon from incremental judicial decisions in federal arbitration cases.
Each state, however, has developed a body of contract law to which
the courts can conveniently look in deciding what "grounds . . . exist . . . for the revocation of any contract."
A second and related reason to adopt nondiscriminatory state
law is that application of independent federal rules may disrupt
commercial relationships. If independent 'federal law applied to arbitration agreements, there would be unsettled areas of law controlling their "making" until federal courts had issued decisions in those
areas. These unsettled areas would be a source of uncertainty for
parties wishing to make an arbitration contract. If parties could assume that nondiscriminatory state laws would apply, this uncertainty
would be removed.9 3
89. This Note defines non-discriminatory state law as the law applicable to "any contract"
under Section 2 of the Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
90. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956). See United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,
68 (1966); H. HART & H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 768
(2d ed. 1973); Note, S11pra note 53, at 1098 ("Incorporation of state rules also may be convenient where the federal judiciary has not formulated a comprehensive body of law"); Chicago
Note, S11pra note 56, at 842-43.
91. H. HART & H. WESCHLER, Sllpra note 90, at 768.
92. See text at notes 14-24 S11pra.
93. See note 77 S11pra. Cf. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 672-73 (1979)
("we should consider . . . the impact a federal rule might have on existing relationships under
state law"); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979) ("application of a
federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law"); United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580,595 (1973) ("the established body of state property
law should generally govern federal land acquisitions"); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver
County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) ("the congressional purpose can best be accomplished by
application of settled state rules as to what constitutes 'real property' "); Chicago Note, supra
note 56, at 843.
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The federal interests in adopting state laws that do not discriminate against arbitration thus outweigh the federal interests in creating a uniform federal law of arbitration independent of state law.
Courts should therefore adopt nondiscriminatory state law as the
Act's rule of decision.
B.

Corollaries ofAdopting Nondiscriminatory State Law

The fundamental adoption analysis is thus established. Nondiscriminatory state law should be adopted and discriminatory state
law should not. But three corollary questions remain. First, what
law should courts apply in place of ousted discriminatory state rules?
Second, may a court ever decide not to apply a state rule that, although it does not discriminate against arbitration, nonetheless
makes arbitration agreements more difficult to enforce than another
state would? Finally, should courts adopt state rules that discriminate in favor of arbitration agreements? The answers to these three
questions flow logically from the preceding analysis.
Once a court determines that a state law discriminates against
arbitration, that law is ousted by the Act.94 Next the court must decide what rule should replace the ousted rule. The court might apply
either the general - and by definition, nondiscriminatory - state
law of contract, or an independent federal rule. This latter choice
matches the one a court would have to make if there had never been
a discriminatory state rule in the first place. As shown above, 95 the
court should apply nondiscriminatory state law in such cases. 96
State contract law that does not discriminate against arbitration
agreements, but makes the formation of all contracts, including arbitration agreements, more difficult than does the law of other states,
should be applied under the Act. This conclusion also follows from
the preceding adoption analysis. The congressional purpose to make
the law governing arbitration conform to the law governing commercial contracts97 controls, given the absence of any purpose to favor
arbitration. 98 As long as arbitration stands on the "same footing" 99
as "any contract," 100 there is no conflict with Section 2 of the Act,
94. See text at notes 64-70 supra.
95. See notes 75-93 supra and accompanying text.
96. For example, in Collins Radio v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1972), discussed supra at notes 68-70 and accompanying text, a court refused to apply a Texas state law that
imposed a higher standard of validity on arbitration agreements than on other contracts. The
Collins court held that the arbitration agreement was valid under "general contract law," 467
F.2d at 999; had the court applied this Note's analysis, it would presumably have reached the
same result under general Texas contract law.
91. See text at notes 85-89 supra.
98. See text at notes 75-83 supra.
99. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1924).
100. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1976).
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and no need to modify state law.
Finally, if state law favors the formation or enforcement of arbitration agreements above other contracts, courts should nevertheless
adopt such rules under the Act. A state might desire to promote the
formation and enforcement of arbitration agreements in order to reduce court backlogs or speed the resolution of commercial disputes,
and might therefore make arbitration agreements easier to form or
enforce than ordinary contracts. 101 Congress, of course, declared
that it sought in the Act to place arbitration agreements "upon the
same footing as other contracts;" 102 state pro-arbitration laws seem
inconsistent with this purpose. But the conflict with the Act is semantic, not substantive: Congress wanted to establish a congruence
between the law governing arbitration and the law governing other
contracts, but such congruence is only necessary to help parties
achieve their contractual intent. 103 Even if the Act allows parties to
ignore the effect of state rules that discriminate against arbitration, it
does not necessarily require them to ignore pro-arbitration rules.
Congress's primary purpose was to overcome state hostility to arbitration; 104 it did not contemplate the problem of discriminatory favoritism. Only if the Act required uniform federal rules governing
arbitration would state rules favoring arbitration be displaced. Since
the Act does not require independent federal rules, 105 state rules
favoring arbitration agreements are not inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and should be incorporated as rules of decision. 106
These three corollaries to the decision to apply nondiscriminatory state law complete the list of principles that should govern incorporation of state law under the Act. First, when a party seeks to
stay court proceedings pending arbitration under Section 3 or order
arbitration under Section 4, a court should decide whether the
party's allegation puts the making of the separable arbitration agreement, as distinct from the underlying contract, in issue. A court
should not order arbitration or stay proceedings pending arbitration
10 I. A hypothetical example of a rule that discriminates in favor of arbitration would be a
rule providing that arbitration provisions are never material alterations under U.C.C. § 2-207
and so always become part of the contract if contained in either the order or confirmation
form. See text at notes 109-19 infra. Cf. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 251, § 2A (Michie/Law Coop) (court may order consolidation of arbitration proceedings notwithstanding the parties'
agreement to the contrary).
102. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. l (1924).
103. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
105. See text and notes 71-89 supra.
106. Of course, there might come a point at which a state's pro-arbitration law would become so inimical to the parties' intent as to actually discourage the formation of any arbitration agreements. At that point, the policies of the Act might well be sufficiently offended to
require the courts to replace pro-arbitration laws with the law governing the formation of
ordinary contracts in the state.
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if the party alleges facts that, under a state law that does not discriminate against arbitration agreements, would put the making of the
separable arbitration agreement in issue. Second, a court should not
apply state laws that discriminate against arbitration, nor allow them
to place the making in issue. State laws discriminate if they create
grounds for the nonenforcement of arbitration agreements and those
grounds do not apply to other contracts. Third, a court should replace discriminatory state rules with the rules generally applicable to
all contracts in the state. Fourth, a court should not oust nondiscriminatory state rules even though they make the enforcement of
arbitration agreements more difficult in that state than in other
states. Finally, a court should adopt state rules that favor arbitration
_over other contracts. The following Section will apply these principles to several illustrative state laws.
III.

IDENTIFYING DISCRIMINATORY STATE LAWS

In most circumstances, courts should have little difficulty in applying a rule that directs them to adopt nondiscriminatory state law.
A party seeking to prevent arbitration will claim that the making of
the arbitration agreement is in issue, and the court will easily discover whether the state rule underlying the claim discriminates
against arbitration agreements. Most state rules of contract formation and construction do not discriminate against arbitration, and
can be confidently applied. Some state rules apply unique standards
to arbitration agreements, and can be just as easily rejected. For example, a state rule might interpret arbitration agreements so narrowly as to submit only matters listed in the agreement to
arbitration. 107 Unless such a rule of "express enumeration" applied
to other contracts in the state, it could not place the making of an
arbitration agreement in issue.
In a few cases· it will be more difficult to decide whether a state
rule discriminates against arbitration. Occasionally a rule that appears innocuous on its face turns out to be discriminatory as applied
in state courts. Similarly, a rule that appears to discriminate against
107. See, e.g., Flood v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 2d 91, 94 (1968) ("parties are only
bound to arbitrate those issues which by clear language they have agreed to arbitrate; arbitration agreements will not be extended by construction or implication"); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Cook, 21 Ariz. App. 313 (1974) (following Flood, supra). New York courts often require
"clear" intent to form an arbitration agreement. E.g., Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. TillinghastStiles Co., 306 N.Y. 288, 291, 118 N.E.2d 104, 106, 128 N.Y.S.2d (1954) (arbitration provision
not incorporated by reference: "The intent must be clear to render arbitration the exclusive
remedy"). New York does not appear to have a similar requirement for other types of contracts.
State laws might call for narrow interpretation of broadly worded arbitration clauses. See,
e.g., Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plotnick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366, 163 N.Y.2d 639 (1957),
overruled in Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y.2d 190, 298 N.E.2d 43, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848, (1973); Flood
v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 2d 91, 242 N.E.2d 149 (1968).
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arbitration sometimes may mereJy state explicitly the rule already
applied to all other contracts. 108 The varying ways in which courts
have applied the "material alteration" clause of section 2-207 of the
Uniform Commercial Code best illustrates the need to look at the
application of a state rule as well as its language in deciding whether
it is discriminatory.
Section 2-207 governs the "battle of the forms" that ensues when
merchants exchange sales and purchase forms that contain different
provisions. Provisions that are "material alterations" will not become part of the contract without the specific consent of the other
party. 109 A state law might provide that an arbitration clause contained in a sales contract confirmation form always constitutes a
"material alteration" under section 2-207, and thus never becomes
part of the contract unless both parties explicitly agree to the arbitration clause. A New York case, In re Marlene Industries Corp.
(Carnac Textiles, Inc.), 110 held that an arbitration clause is always a
"material alteration," even in the textile industry where arbitration is
routine. 111 The court said it would require "unequivocal agreement"
and a "clear indication of intent" to arbitrate before it would compel
arbitration. 112 In so holding, the court ignored the standards set
108. The reader might profitably compare the distinction drawn in equal protection cases
between laws that explicitly discriminate against racial or ethnic minorities, see, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. l (1967) (statute prohibiting marriages on basis of race), and those that are
racially "neutral" on their face but are administered in a discriminatory way, see, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (statute requiring that all voter applicants understand
the Constitution, but applied only against blacks); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(statute requiring certificate to operate a laundry in a wood building enforced only against
Chinese). Moreover, a statute that disadvantages one group may so disadvantage other groups
as to negate an inference of discriminatory purpose. See, e.g., Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) (absolute veterans preference in civil service
hiring disadvantages many men as well as women). See generally, W. LOCKHART, Y.
KAMISAR & J. CttOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1258-97 (5th ed. 1980).
109. The section provides, in pertinent part:
§ 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter ir, or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a
reasonable time after notice of them is received. [emphasis added.)
See, e.g., In re Marlene Indus. Corp. (Camac Textiles, Inc.), 45 N.Y.2d 327, 380 N.E.2d 239,
408 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1978); Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 285 N.C. 344,
204 S.E.2d 834 (1934). See generally Note, U.CC 2-207: Boiler Plates and Arbitration
Clauses, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 143 (1978).
110. 45 N.Y.2d 327, 380 N.E.2d 239, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1978).
111. See, e.g., Helen Whiting, Inc. v. Trojan Textile Corp., Inc., 307 N.Y. 360, 367, 121
N.E.2d 367, 370, 134 N.Y.S.2d (1954); Copen Assoc., Inc. v. Dan River, Inc., 18 U.C.C. REP.
62, 63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
112. 45 N.Y.2d at 333-34, 380 N.E.2d at 242, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
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forth in New York's official comments to section 2-207. Those standards define materiality in terms of whether the term "would result
in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by
the other party." 113 Because it does not apply the same legal standards to arbitration agreements as to other contracts, the Marlene
rule should not be adopted as the appropriate rule of decision under
the Act. 114
A state court might, however, explicitly apply the unfair surprise
standard and nonetheless find an arbitration clause to be a "material
alteration." The court would reach the same result as Marlene, but
would purport to apply state law in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
Courts interpreting the Act would have to decide whether this result
was permissible. Section 2 of the Act is apparently satisfied by the
application of the unfair surprise standard to both arbitration agreements and other contracts. But the term "unfair surprise" admits of
such a wide variation in interpretation 115 that a state might selectively disfavor arbitration, despite the ostensibly uniform application
of its law. A court applying the Act should ensure that a state law is
nondiscriminatory in practice as well as in verbal formula. Suppose,
for example, that state law normally does not consider a confirmation-form term a material alteration if the term conforms to the "usage of the trade." 116 The Act would then require a rule that
arbitration clauses are not material alterations where arbitration
conforms to trade usage.
However, a state might have a per se material alteration rule and
yet not discriminate against arbitration agreements. If the state did
not employ the unfair surprise standard for U.C.C. § 2-207, and if it
defined "material alteration" broadly, almost no term contained in a
confirmation. form could become part of the contract under section
2-207. In effect, such a state would require acceptance forms to
"mirror" the offer. In non-sales transactions, this mirror-image
113. U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 4 (McKinney).
114. See text at notes 67-70 supra.
Some courts have adopted the Marlene rule as the measure of federal law under the Act,
and others have not. Compare Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135 (4th
Cir. 1979) (holding that there is no conflict between Marlene and the Act, and applying a per
se material-alteration rule for arbitration provisions), Duplan Corp. (Duplan Yarn Div.) v.
W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and John Thallon & Co. v.
M&N Meat Co., 396 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding arbitration clause is material per
se; resting on New York law), with Medical Dev. Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d
345, 348 (10th Cir. 1973) ("The question of a material alteration rests upon the facts of each
case"), and Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972) (declining to
follow New York law, holding material alterations are questions of fact).
I 15. q: cases cited in note 114 supra.
I 16. U.C.C. § 2-207, Official Comment 4 (1978 version).
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ru.le 117 still governs the "battle of the forms" in several"states. 118 A
mirror-image rule does not conflict with the Act so long as the state
applies it evenly to all contract provisions. Thus, courts must occasionally examine how U.C.C. § 2-207 and other state rules are applied, as well as how they are phrased, to determine whether they
discriminate against agreements to arbitrate. 119
State unconscionability rules pose a unique and difficult problem
for courts applying a nondiscrimination test. A state rule that held
all arbitration agreements unconscionable per se would be essentially a disguised version of the common-law rule that arbitration
agreements are unenforceable 120 and would clearly conflict with section 2 of the Act. Assuming that a state applies its unconscionability
rules both to arbitration agreements and to other contract terms, the
difficult question becomes whether the Act ever permits a state to
hold an arbitration agreement unconscionable. On the one hand, the
Act contemplates that the full range of legal and equitable defenses
to the enforcement of any contract will be available to parties opposing arbitration, 121 and many states recognize an unconscionability
defense to contract enforcement. 122 On the other hand, a finding of
unconscionability seems to reflect a judicial determination that arbitration is unfair, a view that implies judicial hostility toward arbitration.
By looking to the source of the unconscionability, courts in many
cases should be able to find arbitration agreements unconscionable
without discriminating against arbitration. A state court does not
discriminate against arbitration if it holds an arbitration agreement
unconscionable for reasons that do not arise solely because an arbi-:
117. The "rule of exact acceptance," as it is sometimes called, see U.C.C. § 2-207, N.Y.
Annot. § 1 (McKinney), holds that "an acceptance, to be effectual, must be identical with the
offer and unconditional." 17 C.J.S. Contracts§ 43 (1963).
118. See, e.g., Hall & Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 34 A.D.2d 1038, 310 N.Y.S.2d 950
(1970), qffd, 30 N.Y.2d 517, 280 N.E.2d 890, 330 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); Poel v. BrunswickBalke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915); Trautwein v. Leavey, 472 P.2d 776
(Wyo. 1970).
119. See text at notes 97-100 supra.
120. See note 6 supra.
121. Section 2 preserves as valid such grounds for revocation as exist for "any contract." 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924): "The [Act's enforcement] procedure is very simple, following the lines of ordinary motion procedure . . . and at
the same time sefeguarding the rights efthe parties. ... If one party is recalcitrant he can no
longer escape his agreement, but his rights are amply protected'' (emphasis added).
122. See, e.g., Gelderman & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1975);
Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Wille v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976); Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274
A.2d 78 (Dist. Ct. 1970); American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maciver, 105 N.H. 435, 201
A.2d 886 (1964); Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, 58
A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), revd on issue efrelief, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 964 (App.
Ct. 1967); W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975); Schroeder v.
Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975). See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 147-73 (2d ed. 1980).
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trator rather than a judge or jury decides the dispute. For example, a
court might reasonably refuse to enforce a provision requiring the
weaker party to travel great distances in order to arbitrate any
claims. 123 A court might also refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement where excessive filing fees for arbitration would preclude the
weaker party from any action on the contract. 124 Both such contracts
would impose oppressive expenses on the weaker party as prerequisites to arbitration; a court should be as free to find a gross inadequacy of consideration for these terms as it would to find inadequate
consideration for any other oppressive contract term. 125 Since a
finding of unconscionability would require no determination that arbitration itself - the change in tribunal - is unfair, such a finding
would not conflict with the Act. 126
Even a finding that the change in tribunal itself is so grossly onerous or advantageous to one party as to be unconscionable is permitted under the Act. 127 In most cases, arbitration benefits both parties
equally, as for instance where commercial parties bargain at arms'
length. 128 But some parties may agree to arbitrate because the contract as a whole is beneficial to them, even though arbitration may be
to their disadvantage. 129 Potential personal injury plaintiffs are such
123. Cf. Player v. Geo. M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 18 Cal. App. 3d S26, S36, 96 Cal. Rptr.
149, 1S6 (1971) ("We think the courts . . . should scan closely contracts which bear facial
resemblance to contracts of adhesion and which contain cross-country arbitration clauses").
124. Cf. Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 977, 119 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174
(1975) (requiring defendant to bear cost of filing fee for arbitration: "a contractor may not use
a[n arbitration] provision in a contract such as this to effectively deny such home owner an
opportunity to press a damage claim against him").
125. See Goldberg, Arbitration of Claims of Contract Unconscionabilil)', S6 N.D. L. REV. 7
(1980).
126. Contractual terms such as those discussed here do not concern the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements within the meaning of the Act. Such terms are accessory
obstacles to arbitration, obstacles which can be separately scrutinized under state law without
even invoking the Act.
127. Compare Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 34S, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976)
(court refused to enforce arbitration clause in hospital admission contract), andBoard of Educ.
v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439,447 (Sup. Ct. W. Va. 1977) (in dictum; unconscionable arbitration clauses are unenforceable), with Bunge Corp. v. Williams, 45 111. App. 3d 359,
359 N.E.2d 844, 21 U.C.C. REP. 436 (1977) (arbitration clause in form contract not fraudulent
or unconscionable), and Copen Assoc., Inc. v. Dan River, Inc., 18 U.C.C. REP. 62 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1975) (arbitration clause incorporated by reference not unconscionable despite inequality
of bargaining power). See also E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Schank, 4S6 F. Supp. S07, S10 (D. Utah
1976) (arbitration provision not unconscionable; court took note of state law ofunconscionability).
128. In Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 34S, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976), the
court distinguished the tort plaintiff from the plaintiff seeking damages for breach of contract.
In the latter case, said the court, arbitration affects the plaintiff and defendant equally, since
most contract actions are tried to judges and not juries. 63 Cal. App. 3d at 363, 133 Cal. Rptr.
at 787-88. See Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. S3S, S43-44 (D. Neb. 1976), a.ffd.,
571 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1978).
129. See 63 Cal. App. 3d at 360-61, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 786:
"Unless advised by his doctor to the contrary, the patient normally feels he has no choice
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a class. By agreeing to arbitrate, the potential plaintiff gives up a
potential jury-verdict windfall; the potential defendant gains a corresponding reduction in potential liability. 130 After considering the
magnitude of the advantage flowing to the potential defendant, a
court may conclude that that advantage was unfairly procured, without necessarily implying that arbitration is unfair. The court simply
asks whether there has been adequate consideration or fair bargaining for a substantial exchange. Since a court asks the same question
in any unconscionability case, it does not discriminate against arbitration agreements by holding that some of them confer unconscionable advantages on one party. Therefore, courts should adopt in
arbitration cases those state rules of unconscionability that rest on a
finding of unbargained-for advantage.
CONCLUSION

Congress failed to specify how the Federal Arbitration Act alters
the applicability of state contract law to commercial arbitration
agreements. Courts, usually basing their choice between state and
federal law on vague appeals to the Act's underlying policies, have
differed in the extent to which they incorporate state laws as federal
rules of decision. The Supreme Court in Prima Paint gave this issue
only "summary treatment," 131 ingeniously discovering an express
rule of separability in section 4 rather than providing a general principle for determining which state rules, if any, survive the Act.
Courts can disentangle the muddle by looking beyond Prima Paint
and section 4 of the Act to the language and purpose of section 2.
In order for a rule to place the making of a separable arbitration
agreement in issue under section 4, the rule must first comply with
the requirements of section 2. State laws that treat arbitration agreements like other contracts satisfy these requirements. Courts should
apply these nondisctjminatory state laws because they are accessible
and because they promote the Act's objective: they put arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts.

but to seek admission to the designated hospital and to accede to all of the terms and
conditions for admission, including the signing of all forms presented to him."
130. See 63 Cal. App. 3d at 361, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 786:
The manifest objective of a medical entity in including an arbitration clause is to avoid a
jury trial and thereby hopefully minimize losses for any medical malpractice and correspondingly to hold down the amount of any recovery by the patient.
131. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,425 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting).

